Week 5
First, read Warneken & Tomasello (2008) with a focus on the similarities and differences between human children and non-human primates in how they provide for others (or share with others) (a) resources, (b) efforts/services, and (c) information. Then read Hamlin (2014) as you read, try to think about the link between the focus of W&T (2008) paper (altruism, prosociality) and what Hamlin calls (a) Moral Goodness; note also that Hamlin actually focuses more on the other two requirements (b) Moral Understanding/Evaluation and (c) Retribution.
1. W & T (2008) suggests that the three forms of altruism (offering resources, efforts, and information) differ with respect to what is being offered or shared. Do these three forms differ only in terms of what is offered/shared (i.e., regardless of what is being shared, the same cognitive mechanism underlies the ways in which children reason about how to help) or could there be other differences (i.e., depending on what is being shared, we use different mechanisms for reasoning about what others need and what we can do to help)?
2. In Hamlin (2014), she reviews studies on moral understanding and evaluation and moral retribution. Do you think the latter (the ability to punish other agents) develops later than moral understanding/evaluation, or do you think they go hand-in-hand, such that if one would understand whos good and whos bad, theyd also be able to punish whos bad?
3. When someone does something bad by mistake (e.g., breaking dishes while trying to put them up on the shelf), we tend to pardon the person given his/her innocent intent. Imagine a three-year-old who judges such action just as harshly as the same action that was done intentionally, focusing only on the outcome. Now, imagine a culture where people (adults) show the same kind of behavior, judging the badness of the action with the same severity regardless of the intent. Would you say that the adults in this culture are morally immature, or less developed? Or, could there be any other explanations? Think back to your answers to Q1 for Week 6 (what kind of cultural differences would lead to a reversal of desire-to-belief development?), and discuss what kind of cultural difference might explain these results.
First, read Wellman (2017) as you are reading, try to take his perspective as a researcher who has been in this field as it emerged and developed over a few decades.
Week 6
Then read Saxes 2.7 B&G chapter, paying attention to the distinction between implicit vs. explicit Theory of Mind.
Then read Tomasello (2018) with a focus on his way of explaining the current data (e.g., infant theory of mind).
1. In Wellman (2017), he describes the Theory-of-Mind scale (see also Table 1) and the order in which children start passing these tasks. Notice there is a pattern of general progression from understanding desires to understanding beliefs, though there are some cross-cultural differences.
Among the components listed in Table 1, do you think there could be a population (e.g., different culture, different experiences, even alien species) that shows a reversed pattern of acquisition of desires and beliefs, i.e., showing an understanding of [2. Diverse beliefs, 3. Knowledge access, 4. Contents false belief] BEFORE showing an understanding of [1. Diverse desires]? If possible, what would alter this order? If not possible, why not?
2. What distinguishes implicit vs. explicit Theory of Mind in Saxes view (please try to express in your own words)? Do you think Tomasello (2018) agrees with this distinction as the key to explaining the existing results? Why, or why not?
3. Imagine these three people were interviewed by a science journalist, If you can express your thoughts on why infants show success on some tasks but fail until preschool years on other tasks in 1-2 sentences, what would you say?. What would their answers be like? Pretend as if you are each one of these researchers and try to express your thoughts.
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Wellman:
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Saxe:
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Tomasello:
Week 7
First, read Warneken & Tomasello (2008) with a focus on the similarities and differences between human children and non-human primates in how they provide for others (or share with others) (a) resources, (b) efforts/services, and (c) information. Then read Hamlin (2014) as you read, try to think about the link between the focus of W&T (2008) paper (altruism, prosociality) and what Hamlin calls (a) Moral Goodness; note also that Hamlin actually focuses more on the other two requirements (b) Moral Understanding/Evaluation and (c) Retribution.
1. W & T (2008) suggests that the three forms of altruism (offering resources, efforts, and information) differ with respect to what is being offered or shared. Do these three forms differ only in terms of what is offered/shared (i.e., regardless of what is being shared, the same cognitive mechanism underlies the ways in which children reason about how to help) or could there be other differences (i.e., depending on what is being shared, we use different mechanisms for reasoning about what others need and what we can do to help)?
2. In Hamlin (2014), she reviews studies on moral understanding and evaluation and moral retribution. Do you think the latter (the ability to punish other agents) develops later than moral understanding/evaluation, or do you think they go hand-in-hand, such that if one would understand whos good and whos bad, theyd also be able to punish whos bad?
3. When someone does something bad by mistake (e.g., breaking dishes while trying to put them up on the shelf), we tend to pardon the person given his/her innocent intent. Imagine a three-year-old who judges such action just as harshly as the same action that was done intentionally, focusing only on the outcome. Now, imagine a culture where people (adults) show the same kind of behavior, judging the badness of the action with the same severity regardless of the intent. Would you say that the adults in this culture are morally immature, or less developed? Or, could there be any other explanations? Think back to your answers to Q1 for Week 6 (what kind of cultural differences would lead to a reversal of desire-to-belief development?), and discuss what kind of cultural difference might explain these results.
Week 9
1. First, read Csibra & Gergely (2009), with a focus on what they mean by natural pedagogy. What are the similarities and differences between natural pedagogy and what they call opportunity teaching (Box1)? In their view, how are humans different from non-human animals in their ability to teach and learn from their conspecifics? Do you agree with their position (why, or why not)?
2. Then read Shafto, Goodman, & Frank (2012) with a focus on distinguishing the differences between learning from physical evidence, goal-directed action, and communicative action, in their implications for learning, and relating this to Fig. 2. In what aspects is communicative action in SG&F similar to ostensive signals in C&Gs paper? In what aspect is it different from ostensive signals?
3. Then read Koenig & Harris (2005) which describes research on childrens tendency to trust adults testimony (unless they have been blatantly wrong in the past, as shown in Fig.1).
Imagine a child who received a gift box but does not know what is inside. When asked Whats inside the box? the child says I dont know. Then, the experimenter peeks inside the box and says Oh, I see a white rabbit inside the box!; when asked again whats inside the box, the child now says A white rabbit! even though the child has never seen what is inside the box.
How did the child come to know what is inside the box? What kind of representations are involved in the childs inferences? Is this kind of learning something more akin to what the C&G paper describes (learning via natural pedagogy) or more akin to what the SG&F paper describes (learning from communicative behaviors)?
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